CS-80 Senior Seminar

Edward Kamonjoh

What, according to Philip Brey, is the point of disclosive computer ethics (DCE)? What are the primary distinctions between mainstream computer ethics and DCE? Why is Brey inclined more towards the pre-theoretical approach in preference to the theory-driven one in the application of disclosive analysis? Are the preconceptions that Brey claims are the shortcomings of a theory-driven approach valid, based on his statement that once DCE make morally controversial computer features and practices visible, that the decision as to whether or not they are morally wrong can be decided later in a theoretical analysis?

What is moral non-transparency? Why does Brey feel that the critical questions of non-transparency in computer-related practice remain unanswered, for the most part, by mainstream computer ethics? One such question that pertains to moral neutrality and hence moral opaqueness is whether computer ethics should focus on the use of computer technology rather that on its design in evaluating and analyzing moral justness and its concomitant ramifications. In what ways has the design (technical or otherwise) of computers and related technologies constrained/governed human development/evolution in an age where human decision-making is increasingly computer dependent? Has our autonomy, freedom and sovereignty as humans really been compromised/jeopardized by their design?

Unconscious/unintentional (or intentional) control of, or restrictions on access to certain sets of data through computer tools such as search engine algorithms that engage in discriminatory information gathering antics by way of bias towards a particular group of people, can tip a lot of political power in favor of those who ‘puppeteer’ these technologies to suit their needs/agendas. To what extent do DCE help address/arrest such scenarios? – Do they do this adequately?